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BAR BRIEFS

NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Olson vs. Union Central Life: Olson gave a mortgage on his
farm to defendant; a second mortgage was given to E. The first
mortgage contained this provision: "In case suit is brought to foreclose this mortgage, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the immediate
appointment of a receiver to take charge of the property and apply
the net income thereof 'on the debt." Olson defaulted. The second
mortgage was foreclosed, and, after sale, the certificate was assigned
to defendant, sheriff's deed issuing. Olson then prosecuted action to
set aside the sale. In that action the second mortgage was declared
void, and foreclosure ineffective. Olson continued in possession in
the meantime, about four years, taking the crops raised by him. Foreclosure of the first mortgage was commenced the fall of the third
year, application for receiver was made the fall of the fourth year,
and the following year defendant obtained its foreclosure, with a
deficiency judgment. Question: Who was entitled to the crop of
the fourth year? HELD: Defendant was required to assert its claim;
until this was done it had no lien or right to the net income; the fact
that the property was in the hands of a receiver in another suit, in
another court, for another purpose, does not relieve the mortgagee;
and when the right was asserted it could apply only to income thereafter accruing.
Warren vs. Slaughbaugh: Case in mandamus, but tried as action
to determine adverse claims to land. Being remanded for determination of certain questions of fact, only the decided points are covered.
Riverdale Homes Co. deeded property to plaintiff, who mortgaged to
pay outstanding incumbrances, deeded back, and then bought the
property on contract for $5200, $1826 of which he has paid. The
Homes Co. then gave a mortgage to R. Lumber Co., after which
several judgments were entered against the Homes Co. The Lumber
Co. mortgage was foreclosed, and the Homes Co. made no effort to
redeem. The day the year of redemption expired one of the judgment
creditors tendered the amount due, and another creditor levied attachment in action against the Homes Co., also paying the amount previously
tendered and demanding certificate. Two days later V., the owner
of a prior judgment, tendered the amount due on foreclosure and no
more; so, also, did the plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed he was a redemptioner under Section 6865 of the Code, which was disputed by
the assertion that he was merely the successor in interest of the mortgagor. Other Code Sections affected are: 8085, 7753, 7754 and 7755.
HELD: The requirement of the statute that "a subsequent redemptioner must pay the sum paid on such last redemption" does not apply
where the prior redemptioner was an "inferior" lien holder; otherwise, priority rights would be destroyed through mere reversal of
the redemption order. Failing to redeem in the order of priority does
not waive rights under the lien. The relative rights of plaintiff and
V. are not determined.
JUSTICE HOLMES
The March issue of the Yale Law Journal contains a very interesting article by Mr. Harold J. Laski, visiting Professor at the Yale
University School of Law, on "The Political Philosophy of Justice
Holmes," from which we quote several paragraphs, to-wit:
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"There is a marked resemblance between the ideas of Bentham
and those of Mr. Justice Holmes (Bentham, Principles of Morals and
Legislation). For both, the need for security is paramount; and the
enjoyment of individual rights is secondary in every case to that
major end. But, with him as with Bentham, once the major end is
safe, the protection of the individual from arbitrary control is a
sacred obligation. Rights may be born of the law; but their plain
intent is to curb the authority of government, and it is therefore
peculiarly incumbent upon the judiciary to watch with special care
their active exercise.
"One final aspect of his attitude may be noticed. I have already
observed that in matters of economic constitution the leanings of Mr.
Justice Holmes are towards the classic doctrines of the nineteenth
century; some, indeed, of his pronouncements upon socialism have
about them a note of acid scorn (Holmes, Collected Legal Papers).
But that has not meant with him, as it has not seldom meant in
decisions of the Supreme Court, an effort to exalt the rights of
property into a place of special privilege in the state. So long as a
government treats the owner of an acquired title with fairness, he is
'infected with the original weakness of dependence upon the will of
the state' (Western Union vs. Kansas, 216 U. S. i). It is impossible
to hold that 'all property owners in a State have a vested right that
no general proposition of law shall be reversed, changed or modified
by the courts if the consequence to them will be more or less pecuniary
loss' (Muhlker vs. N. Y. & Harlem, 197 U. S. 544). A State cannot
be prevented from discouraging particular forms of economic activity
by special methods of taxation (Quaker City Cab Co. vs. Pennsylvania,
277 U. S. 389). Property may not be taken without compensation,
'but with the help of a phrase, (the police power) some property may
be taken or destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do
not take too much. When we come to the fundamental distinctions,
it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude
or our government could not go on' (Springer vs. Philippine Islands,
277 U. S. i89). He has protested on many occasions against an effort
to make the Fourteenth Amendment a method for specially protecting
the rights of property by reading into it a 'delusive exactness' which is,
in sober fact, contrary to its nature. 'By calling a business property,'
he has urged, 'you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down the advantages of
ownership existing before the statute was passed. . . It is a course
of conduct and like other conduct, is subject to substantial modification according to time and circumstances both in itself and in regard
to what shall justify doiug it harm. . . Legislation may begin where
an evil begins' (Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312).
"The last sentence is the key to the whole. The inherent power
of the state to meet its problems as they may arise is, for him, the
unassailable and primordial postulate of political science. To that
end it possesses sovereignty; and the limitations upon the exercise of
its power are, in his conception, what may be termed limitations of
manner rather than of substance. Judicial prohibitions, therefore,
must be aimed not at the object sought for, but at the way in which
the object is sought. Admittedly, manner and substance shade off
inextricably the one into the other; 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white' (Springer
vs. Philippine Islands). But it is in the recognition that mathematical
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exactitude is not attainable in social legislation, that, accordingly,
unless the individual right is gravely invaded the social interest must
prevail, that the criterion of constitutionality must be found. It is
difficult not to feel that Mr. Justice Holmes' long emphasis upon this
attitude has humanized the jurisprudence of the United States.
"In the proud preface to Montesquieu's last work there are certain
words than which none are more fitting to Mr. Justice Holmes' labors.
'When I have seen,' wrote Montesquieu, 'what so many great men in
France, England and Germany have written before me, I have been
lost in admiration, but without losing my courage; I, too, am a painter,
I have said with Correggio.' That, as I think, has been the secret of
Mr. Justice Holmes' preeminence in his time. It is 'not only that he
has had the scholar's breadth of knowledge. It is not merely, either,
that he has realized how the facts call the judge, and especially, perhaps, the American judge, to the tasks of statesmanship. Both these
qualities he has had in full measure. But, above all, he has had the
great artist's power of penetrating with the vision of genius to the
essential, of making the bridge between the little fact of daily life
and the sweeping generalization by which a state rises to the consciousness of its purpose. He has done it with singular felicity of expression,
and with unvarying integrity of mind. We can only be humbly grateful
in the presence of so rare and so distinguished an achievement."
REGULATION OF AGENTS' COMMISSIONSFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By the narrow margin of five to four the Supreme Court of the
U. S. has just determined the validity of a New Jersey statute
forbidding fire insurance companies to allow any agent a commission
in excess of a reasonable amount or to allow any local agent a
commission in excess of that allowed to other agents on similar risks.
The agreement between the company and the agent was for "the
reasonable worth of the agent's services," which he contended was
25%. The defense was the statute and the fact that other local agents
received 20%. Justice Brandeis, voicing the judgment of the majority, said: "The business of insurance is so far affected with a
public interest that the State may regulate the rates; . . . and like-

wise the relations of those engaged in the business... The agent's
compensation, being a percentage of the premium, bears a direct relation
to the rate charged the insured. The percentage commonly allowed
is so large that it is a vital element in the rate structure and may
seriously affect the adequacy of the rate. Excessive commissions may
result in an unreasonably high rate level or in impairment of the
financial stability of the insurer. It was stated at the bar that the
commission on some classes of insurance is as high as thirty-five per
cent. Moreover, lack of a uniform scale of commissions allowed
local agents for the same service may encourage unfair discrimination
among policy holders by facilitating the forbidden practice of rebating.
In the field of life insurance, such evils led long ago to legislative
limitation of agents' commissions. The statute here questioned deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption

